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Abstract
Using a large panel of 6,946 French manufacturing firms, this paper investigates the
effect of monetary policy on investment from 1990 to 1999 through the cost-of-capital and
the cash-flow channels. We compare several specifications of neo-classical demand for
capital, taking into account transitory dynamics. The user cost of capital has a significant
negative elasticity with respect to capital using traditional Within estimates, or as long as
cash-flow is not added to the regression when using Generalised Method of Moments
estimates. Asymmetries of effect of monetary policy are evaluated for different groups of
firms which differ in terms of informational asymmetries.When dummy variables related
to firms which are more sensitive to cash-flow are added in the model, the user cost
elasticity is significant again.ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  5
Non-technical summary
In a monetary union, the impact and delays of reactions to monetary policy shocks
differ from country to country, owing to differences between national monetary policy
transmission channels. These differences can be altered by structural policy interventions.
Understanding more precisely how monetary policy transmission channels differ in the
euro area matters not only for monetary policy decisions but also for the monitoring of
structural changes in euro area financial systems, which could decrease in part the
heterogeneity of responses to monetary policy in the area. As in companion papers on
corporate investment by the monetary transmission network of the Euro-system of central
banks, we focus here on the interest rate channel of monetary policy, operating directly
through the effect of the cost of capital on investment, and on the broad credit channel,
operating in part through the effect of retained earnings or cash flow on investment. We
use a large panel of 6,946 French manufacturing firms from 1990 to 1999.
We compare the estimations of several specifications of the neo-classical demand
for capital, which depends on sales and the user cost of capital, adding cash flow to this
model and taking into account transitory dynamics. The user cost elasticity with respect to
capital is negative and statistically significantly different from zero using biased Within
estimates (ranging from -0.31 to ￿0.67), or, as long as cash-flow is not added to the
regression, using more precise Generalised Method of Moments estimates (user cost
elasticity is then at most 0.26 in absolute terms). Asymmetries in the effects of monetary
policy are evaluated for different groups of firms which differ the degree to which they are
financially constrained to raise external funds, and, as a consequence, the degree to which
their investment depends on retained earnings (cash flow). When dummy variables related
to firms which are more sensitive to cash-flow are added to the model, the user cost
elasticity with respect to investment is at most 0.26 in absolute terms for all the firms of
our sample, using Generalised Method of Moments estimates. This confirms the direct
effect of the interest rate channel on investment, operating through the cost of capital in
France (there is also an indirect effect of monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomic
growth of sales, which also affects corporate investment). We isolate three group of firms,
for which investment is more sensitive to cash-flow (i.e. their investment cash flow excess
sensitivity ranges from 0.20 to 0.36): firms facing a high risk of bankruptcy, firms
belonging to the equipment goods sector (which are more sensitive to business cycle
fluctuations) and firms making extensive use of trade credit, a potential substitute for
short-term bank credit. The rather high investment cash flow sensitivity of these firms
(0.22 up to 0.42), which represents about 20% of our sample, confirms the existence of a
broad credit channel operating through corporate investment in France.ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 6
1.  Introduction
It is a widespread belief among economists that monetary policy affects the investment
of firms. However, applied researchers faced difficulties in obtaining a significant effect
of the cost of capital (driven by interest rates) on investment in French macroeconomic
time series and in French forecasting models, as well as on other factor demand related to
the relative cost of factors (see Dormont [1997]). This suggests that maybe monetary
policy works through a broad credit channel rather than through an interest rate channel
for firms investment in France.. In this context, the emphasis has been put on asymmetries
between firms, explained by different degrees of informational asymmetries leading to
specific behaviour by financial intermediaries and financial markets (endogenous
rationing and/or risk premium). This specific behaviour with respect to informational
asymmetries is at the root of asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy to
different economic agents. As a consequence, using microeconomic data allows us to
identify which groups of agents (firms, banks, households) are driving the effects of
monetary policy throughout the economy. This approach avoids aggregation which might
blur the overall effect. For example, some firms may be more sensitive to cash-flow
changes and may drive the behaviour of the aggregate variables whereas a large number of
other firms may be directly affected by a rise in interest rates, and so decrease their output
and factor demand. This paper aims at providing additional results with respect to the
common paper of the monetary transmission network on investment. In particular, it
compares several ways of testing auto-regressive distributed lags models of the neo-
classical demand for capital on a panel data of French manufacturing firms in the nineties
(see Bond, Elston, Mairesse, Mulkay [1997] and Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay [2000],
Harhoff and Ramb [2001], Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer [1999]). Then, different sample
splits are evaluated. In all cases, we compared the neo-classical demand for capital model
with a case in which cash-flow is added into the regressions of this neo-classical demand
for capital. This paper provides a range of estimates of elasticities for sales and user cost
and of sensitivities of capital to cash-flow. It seeks to specify to what extent these
estimates are reliable from a technical point of view, in particular as regards the user cost
of capital. Once we have identified these estimates and the differential effects related to
sample splits, we can use them as a starting point for a tentative overall evaluation of
monetary policy channels as presented in the Chatelain et al. [2001] synthesis paper on
investment of the monetary transmission network of the Eurosystem.ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  7
Section 2 gives an overview of investment and finance of French companies in the
nineties. Sector 3 presents the theoretical model of investment and the estimation method.
Section 4 describes the data set and empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2.  An overview of investment by and financing of French Firms.
2.1 Institutional and Macroeconomic Background.
The financial deregulation of the French economy occurred in the mid 1980s. This
led to considerable change in the money market. Quantitative credit regulation of banks
was stopped. There were changes in the regulation of banks’ activities. Treasury bills took
on greater importance, new financial instruments appeared on the scene, and new equity
markets were set up (￿second marchØ￿). Post-1990 saw a stabilisation in the gains from
monetary and financial innovations obtained by small and medium size companies. This
can be explained by several factors: a recession and low activity period leading to a high
number of failures, a large amount of bad loans for banks, many of which were related to
the end of the bubble in corporate real estate, Cooke ratios for banks and so on.
The business cycle is characterised by relatively high aggregate investment in the
first year (1990) and the last years (1998 and 1999) of our study. Between these dates, low
investment prevailed: low aggregate investment during the years 1991, 1992, 1996 and
1997, with slightly higher investment in 1994 and 1995, which followed an exceptionally
low investment level during the 1993 recession.
3 Monetary policy shifted from high
nominal short-run interest rates from 1990 to 1993 to falling rates from 1994 to 1999. A
striking feature was the inversion of the yield curve from 1991 to 1993 (see figure 6). The
high return from short-run debt caused some firms to delay investment and to accumulate
cash during this period.
Companies in the nineties can be characterised by the following macroeconomic
patterns. Distribution of value added, which had worked to the advantage of corporate
profits since 1983, consolidated at historically high levels over the 1990s. This feature,
combined with low demand due to low-activity years and low investment, had a
remarkable effect. The loss of sales affected aggregate profits far less than aggregate
                                                     
3 These macro-economic movements are reflected in our micro-economic sample, as seen in figures 5 and 6.ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 8
investment. Therefore, a high self-financing ratio prevailed over the period except for the
last two years (aggregate retained earnings/investment ratio were over 100% in several
years of the decade). A direct consequence of this flow of internal income and, perhaps, of
￿high￿ real interest rates for some firms in the early nineties, was a decrease in the
leverage trend, and, in particular, of the share of bank debt in total liabilities. Conversely,
this meant an increase of the share of equity. Furthermore, the fall in interest rates from
1995 to 1999 and the decrease of debt led to a decrease in aggregate debt repayments,
which in turn further increased aggregate retained earnings. This decrease in the relative
size of bank credit to firms may have affected banks’ behaviour and their portfolios. In
2000, firms increased their leverage at the aggregate level.
2.2 Microeconomic background.
It is interesting to check to what extent macroeconomic movements were reflected
in individual firms’ accounts. We now present the changes in balance sheet items over the
nineties using the full sample of manufacturing firms of the Banque de France’s Balance
Sheet Data Centre. Its coverage was 55% of employment in manufacturing in 1997.
First, let us consider the composition of liabilities. The main financing sources of
French companies are internal funds and debts (see figure 1 for mean values). French
corporations improved their financial situation considerably in the first half of the nineties
by raising their internal funds by more than 5 percentage points from 33% in 1990 to
almost 38% in 1999. This increase was particularly pronounced in the accelerating
economic upswing at the end of the eighties, but it also continued at a slower pace during
the following recession.
The ratio of equity to total liabilities demonstrates parallel movements whatever
the size of the firm, except for large firms during 1997 to 1999 (figure 2). A leverage ratio
provides a mirror image of this trend (figure 3). Firms reduced their leverage by more than
6 percentage points between 1990 and 1999. This decreasing trend was relatively
insensitive to cyclical fluctuations. We also observed a declining trend in the share of
bank debt as a percentage of total liabilities. According to the weighted mean, the average
indebtedness of French manufacturing firms to credit institutions decreased slightly,  from
18% in 1990 to 12.2% in 1999 for small firms (from 10.8% to 6.7% for large firms).
Let us now consider the composition of assets. According to the overall weighted
mean, it seems that French firms more or less maintained their stock of tangible fixed
assets with respect to total assets, with the exception of larger businesses, which
significantly reduced their capital stock in the period under review (figure 4). TangibleECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  9
fixed assets first increased slightly up to 1991/92, followed by a reduction of corporate
investment in production capacity.
It may be the case that the long-term trend of tangibles mirrors not only investor
expectations, but to some extent also the growing tendency towards external growth. It
seems that a large proportion of (large) manufacturing firms decided in the first half of the
nineties to channel a major part of their cash flow into the acquisition of financial assets,
especially participating interests, rather than to invest in new tangible fixed assets. The
financial fixed assets ratio increased sharply from 15.6% in 1990 to 22.8% in 1999 due to
the development of the financial market and the rise of equity prices at the end of the
nineties.
2.3 Econometric Evidence on Corporate Investment.
a)  Macroeconomic investigations.
Empirical work on French macroeconomic data faces difficulties when trying to
find a significant effect of the user cost of capital on investment, a problem which has
been shared with U.S. data. According to Blanchard [1986], ￿it is well known that to get
the user cost to appear at all in the investment equation, one has to display more than the
usual amount of econometric ingenuity, resorting most of the time to choosing a
specification that simply forces the effect to be there￿.
The absolute value of the elasticity of the stock of capital with respect to the user
cost is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Three of the five French
forecasting models used in the nineties do not include the cost of capital (Amadeus from
INSEE, Mosa￿que from OFCE, and the Banque de France’s model), while INSEE’s Metric
model adds a relative cost of factors whose parameter is small (-0.016) and not significant
(Assouline et al. [1998]). A fifth model assumes a Cobb Douglas production function
where the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is fixed at one (Hermes
model, Ecole Centrale). Herbet [2001] published a recent estimation of macroeconomic
investment and recognised its failure to incorporate interest rate or user cost effects.
b) Microeconomic and sectoral investigations
-  Effect of the User Cost.
A few recent studies investigate the effect of the user cost on French
microeconomic data. The results depends on the computation of the user cost, on the dataECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 10
selection and the estimation period, on the estimation method and, finally, on the
estimated model and on the choice of explanatory variables.
As for U.S. data (Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer [1999]), the Within estimations are
successful in delivering high significant elasticities. Using the ￿aggregated by size and
sector￿ European dabase BACH, Mojon Smets and Vermeulen [2001] estimated an error
correction model omitting cash-flow. They obtained a very high elasticity for the user cost
for France (-0.75) and for large countries in the euro area (-0.90). Conversely, using the
same database, Beaudu and Heckel [2001] estimated a first differenced neo-classical
demand for capital, adding cash-flow into the regression. They computed the user cost as
the three-month short-run interest rate deflated by value-added price instead of a linear
function of the firms’ apparent debt rate as in Mojon, Smets and Vermeulen [2001]. They
estimated this model in first differences without lags, using ordinary least square corrected
for heteroscedasticity. They found a significant elasticity of (-0.02) pooling all countries
and a 0 elasticity for the group of large countries including France.
Using a sample of individual firms’ accounts (BIC, BØnØfices Industriels et
Commerciaux) at INSEE, CrØpon and Gianella [2001] estimated neo-classical capital and
labour demand simultaneously. In their estimated capital demand equation, they did not
add cash-flow nor lags of explanatory variables. They selected two years of their panel
(1990 and 1995 taken from the period 1984 to 1997) with considerable differences in
investment and user cost. They used a limited amount of the statistical informations that
was available to them. They used instrumental variables but not generalised method of
moments (GMM) estimators. They indirectly obtained a user cost elasticity of (-0.63) for
industry and of (-0.35) for services. Using the BRN (bØnØfices normaux rØels) sample of
the BIC sample, Duhautois [2001] aggregated data by sector and size from 1985 to 1996.
He estimated investment as a function of earnings before interest and taxes, leverage and a
real apparent interest rate, omitting the growth of sales. Using the Within estimator, he
found a real interest rate elasticity of (￿0.38) from 1985 to 1990 and of (￿0.27) for the
period 1991-1996. None of these papers includes an estimation of user cost elasticity
using French microeconomic data and GMM estimates.
-  Effect of Liquidity or Financial Variables.
Cash-flow, cash stock, leverage and coverage ratio are some of the liquidity
variables which reflect at least partly the broad credit channel of monetary policy. Models
estimating investment as a function of sales growth and cash-flow have been around for a
long time (Hall, Mairesse, Mulkay [2000]). We mention only a few recent papers using
French microeconomic data and estimating asymmetries in firms’ sensitivity to liquidity
variables.ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  11
Using Euler investment equations where the cost of debt increases with leverage,
Chatelain and Teurlai [2000a] show that the investment of some firms which are
financially ￿healthy￿ with respect to criteria such as a high dividend/payout ratio or high
investment/retained earnings depends on leverage (i.e. already a credit channel effect),
whereas other firms are subject to another kind of financial constraints where cash-flow
matters (their estimation period is 1993-1996). Using individual data on leasing, Chatelain
and Teurlai [2000b] found that small firms with a high share of capital financed by leasing
were also more sensitive to the credit channel. CrØpon et Rosenwald [2001] showed that
the leverage parameter is lower for small firms during the high activity years 1988 and
1989 (their estimation period was 1986-1993). This means that the agency premium was
lower for these firms at that time. The neo-classical demand for capital estimated by
Beaudu et Heckel [2001] led to a higher investment/cash flow sensitivity of small firms
during monetary restriction years. In Duhautois [2001], leverage explains investment of
small firms from 1985 to 1996 in a regression where sales growth is an omitted variable.ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 12
3.  The Intertemporal Behaviour of Firms
3.1 Theoretical Model
We consider a profit-maximising firm which does not face adjustment costs of
investment but does face tax deductibility of depreciation and interest charges as well as a
marginal cost of debt increasing with leverage. A one-period model was developed by
Auerbach [1983] and Hayashi [2000] presented an intertemporal continuous time version.
Our presentation is based on discrete time intertemporal optimisation of firms facing
uncertainty. With respect to King and Fullerton’s [1984] approach, we do not take into
account the differences in household taxation with respect to dividends and retained
earnings nor the distinction between different capital goods for the computation of the net
present value of depreciation allowances. We assume one financial constraint: the cost of
debt increases with leverage. However, a firm can always get round this constraint using
negative dividends or new share issues. We do not take into account other financial
constraints such as positive dividends, a transaction cost for new share issues, or a debt
ceiling constraint.
Analysing investment begins with an expression of the value of the firm, which in turn
stems from the arbitrage condition governing the valuation of shares for risk-neutral
investors. The return for the risk-neutral owners of firm i at time t reflects capital
appreciation and current dividends. In equilibrium, if the owners are to be content holding
their shares, this return must equal  t ρ  the nominal return on other risky financial assets
between period t and period  1 + t  :
4
(1)      ( ) [ ] ( )
t
it
t i t it t i t i t
V
d E V V E
ρ =
+ − Ψ − + + + 1 , 1 , 1 ,
In what follows, the subscript i always refers to firm i and the subscript t to year t,  t E
is the expectation operator conditional on information known at time t,  it d  are dividends,
it V  is the firm’s nominal market value (it is equal to the number of existing shares times
the share price 
E
it p ),  it Ψ  is new share issues. Solving this iterative arbitrage condition
                                                     
4 To be more precise, ρ  is an expected return on a large number of risky financial assets between date t  and
date  1 + t . Applying the law of large numbers leads this expected return to be considered as realized ex-post
and therefore known with certainty ex-ante.ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  13
leads investors in firm i to choose the stock of capital and debt by maximizing the present
value of dividends less new share issues at time t in a infinite horizon:
(2) 

































= ∞ β ,
where the firm’s one-period nominal discount factor is     ) 1 /( 1 t t ρ β + = . Investment
it I  is defined by the capital stock  it K  accounting identity:
(3)      ()    1 1 , − − − = t i it it K K I δ ,
δ  is the constant rate of economic depreciation. The flow of funds equation defines
corporate dividends. Cash inflows include sales, new share issues, and net borrowing,
while cash outflows consist of dividends, factor and interest payments, and investment
expenditures. Labour charges, interest charges and accounting depreciation are tax
deductible. For simplification, we consider that accounting depreciation does not differ
from economic depreciation. An investment tax credit rate  it itc  is taken into account:
(4)     
()( ) []
() ( ) []    1 itc 1          
, 1
1 , 1 ,
1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,
− −
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Where  it N  is a vector of variable factors of production,  () it it N K F ,  is the firm’s
revenue function ( 0   , 0 < > KK K F F ),  t w  is a vector of nominal factor prices,  it i  is the
nominal interest rate on debt,  it B  is the value of net debt outstanding,  it p  is the price of
final goods, 
I
st p  is the sectoral price of capital goods; 
S
st p  is the price of new share issues;
t τ  is the corporate income tax rate, against which interest payments and depreciation are
assumed to be deductible.
The nominal interest rate on debt at time t depends on an agency premium which
increases with debt and decreases with capital taken as collateral and therefore valued by
the current resale price of investment. We assume that the debt interest rate increases with
the debt/capital ratio:  .   0  with  ,    ) / (
’ > it it
I
st it it i K p B iECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 14
After substitution of dividends by the flow of funds and of investment using the capital
stock equation, we provide first order conditions for the maximisation of the firm’s value.
First, the Euler equation with respect to debt is:
(5)￿. 
()
() ( ) 0 1   1




















































This condition shows that the optimal debt/capital ratio is independent from the choice
of capital (the optimal debt/capital ratio is unique if for example  0 2
’ ’ ’ > + i i ). This
optimal debt/capital ratio results from the trade-off between the tax advantage of debt and
the increase of the agency costs premium. It is such that the optimal gap between the rate
of return on equity (i.e. the opportunity cost of equity) and the net-of-tax marginal cost of
debt is positive. The Euler equation with respect to capital is:
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The term  1 1 c −  leads to the Hall and Jorgenson (1967) formula for the cost of capital
without tax distortions between means of finance and between depreciated assets. The
term  2 c  is obtained after substitution using the Euler condition on debt. It decreases the
cost of capital due to the deductibility of interest charges under the constraint of anECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  15
increasing cost of debt as leverage increases. In this respect, a higher optimal leverage
decreases the cost of capital. The term  3 c  decreases the cost of capital due to the
deductibility of depreciated capital. To take into account the case where accounting
depreciation differs from constant economic depreciation, one has to cancel the third term
of the cost of capital  3 c  and substitute the correction of the investment price () it itc 1−
everywhere it appears by () it it z − − itc 1 , where  it z  is the net present value of
depreciation allowances (Hayashi [2000, p.60]).
Using a first order approximation with respect to the rate of depreciation, to the tax-
corrected inflation rate of the price of investment goods and to the rate of return on equity,
one finds a weighted average cost of capital used by applied researchers (the cost of equity
and the after-tax cost of debt are weighted by their relative share with respect to capital):
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The Hayashi [2000, p.80] formula can be obtained by setting the investment tax credit
it itc  to zero and by assuming a constant corporate income tax rate ( 1 , + = t i t it Eτ τ ). In our
applied work, we set the investment tax credit rate to zero for reasons detailed in the data
appendix and we used an accounting measure of leverage instead of an economic one (the
denominator is accounting debt and equity instead of the stock of capital computed by the
perpetual inventory method). This is empirically justified on the grounds that it is the
accounting proportions of debt or of equity which matter for taxation.
With respect to the monetary transmission channels, this cost of capital takes into
account the interest rate channel, a part of the credit channel (leverage), the asset price
channel (inflation rate of asset prices such as firms’ property prices, and the price of
collateralisable assets used in leverage), as well as potential reactions to monetary policy
of tax policies supporting corporate investment. But it does not take into account other
credit channel effects due to the existence of a positive dividends constraint, whose
Lagrange multiplier would alter the Euler equation
3.2 Econometric Model
We set the production function as a CES production function ( it S is sales):ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 16
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A, a, and b are productivity parameters, υ  represents returns to scale and σ  is the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Computing the marginal productivity
of capital and taking logs (small letters represent logs of capital letters), we obtain this
long-run demand for capital:



















For simplification, productivity is assumed to be of the form 
2 1 η η
t i it A A A = , so that the
constant and the productivity term  () () a Ait . ln ln ] / ) 1 [( υ σ υ σ + − −  are taken into
account by the constant related to individual firms (fixed effect) and the time dummies.
We assume an econometric adjustment process in the form of an auto-regressive
distributed lag model with two lags with respect to the auto-regressive term and two lags
with respect to explanatory variables (ADL(2,2)), as in Hall, Mairesse, Mulkay [2000].
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where  i α  is an individual constant (fixed effect),  t α  is a time constant (year effect)
and  it ε  is a random shock. We add cash-flow (otherwise  a potentially omitted variable)
on the grounds that our model does not take fully into account financial constraints. The
long-run elasticity of sales is given by  ) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 2 1 0 γ γ β β β β − − + + = LT  and the
long-run elasticity of the cost of capital is given by
) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 2 1 0 γ γ σ σ σ σ − − + + − = − LT . Return to scale is given by
) /( ) 1 ( LT LT LT σ β σ ν − − = . As explained later, we estimate this model in first
differences using the generalised method of moments (GMM). The endogenous variable is
then  it k ∆  where ∆  is the first difference operator ( 1 , − − = ∆ t i it it k k k ).ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  17
In model ADL-I, the aim is only to write the investment ratio as the explanatory
variable. We subtract  1 , − t i k  from both sides in order to use the approximation
δ − = ∆ − ) / ( 1 ,t i it it K I k . The Taylor rest of the power series:
() ( ) () 
+∞
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− − − =
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is neglected. (We computed the stock of capital using the perpetual inventory method
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Estimated with GMM first differences, the endogenous variable is now the first
difference of a growth rate. Due to the approximation, model ADL-I has the drawback that
the error term includes power series of the endogenous variable as the differences of the
Taylor rest:  1 , − − t i it R R . We intend to verify whether this approximation matters. Note
that, as the value of current investment is deflated by the price of current investment, we
use the same deflator for cash flow.
The next model is the error correction model ECM(2,2) used on panel data by Hall,
Mairesse and Mulkay [2001] among others. They transform model ADL-I as follows:
(12)  
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Error correction models have been introduced in time series analyses of co-integration.
In particular, the long-run relationship is often estimated in a first step, with residuals
which are integrated of order zero, and the ECM is estimated for transitory dynamics as aECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 18
second step. Up to now, applied econometric papers using panel data with a small number
of years and a large number of firms did not take into account co-integration. An argument
put forward by Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay [2001] is that the ECM(2,2) on panel data can
deal better with the collinearity of variables than the ADL(2,2) and ADL-I. . But
introducing first differences does not remove the potential collinearity between two
variables. First differences can remove the auto-correlation of one of the variables in the
case of a unit root. A drawback of the ECM is that the test for necessary lags is not direct
(in particular lag 2). One needs to recover parameters and standard errors of the ADL(2,2)
and ADL-I models from the ECM parameters and variance-covariance matrix. For this
reason, it is more practical to estimate directly the ADL(2,2) and ADL-I models. We also
estimate this ECM(2,2) model to check its differences with the ADL(2,2) and ADL-I.
Using the same approximation as in model ADL-I so that the investment ratio appears
as the explanatory variable instead of the log of capital, Von Kalckreuth [2001], among
others, used first differences of all the variables of the ADL(2,2) model and then added
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The argument put forward for such a model is that productivity of each firm is affected
not only by a fixed effect on the productivity  level but also by another fixed effect on the
productivity  growth rate denoted  i f . Another argument is that the stock of capital
includes measurement errors, mostly due to the initial condition in the perpetual inventory
method. This argument holds for Within estimations but not for the ADL(2,2), ADL-I
andECM model estimated in first differences with GMM, as long as the level of the stock
of capital is not used as an instrument. As seen before, differences in the log of capital do
not depend on the initial condition for computing the stock of capital with the perpetual
inventory method.
To get rid of the fixed effect on growth rate, one can estimate the difference ADL
model using first differences again. When cash-flow is not taken into account, thisECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  19
amounts to estimating second differences of the ADL(2,2) model with instruments in first
differences. Conversely, the estimation of the ADL(2,2) model in GMM first differences
amounts to an estimation of the level of the difference ADL. Note that cash-flow is related
to investment in the difference ADL model. It is seemingly related to investment in the
ECM model, but, in the equivalent ADL model, the first differences of cash-flow/capital
are related to the investment rate.
At least three factors may explain the differences between the GMM results of the
ADL(2,2), ADL-I (or ECM) and the difference ADL: first, fixed effects on the growth rate
of productivity may exist; second, in the difference ADL model, the lagged dependant
variable and residuals are differened twice  2 ,
2
− − = ∆ t i it it ε ε ε  (differening once more
changes the correlation between residuals and the lagged dependant variable); third, first
differences of growth rates enter into the regression in the difference ADL instead of
growth rates in the ADL/ECM model. The hypothesis of a fixed effect on productivity
growth is not so common. It means that firms are able to differ individually with respect to
growth, during an estimation period which should, in principle, be short. Measurement
errors cannot be avoided by  differencing twice with GMM. First differences of the
growth rate are smaller and less auto-correlated than growth rates. From an econometrics
theory viewpoint, none of the above arguments leads to one of the models being
definitively rejected with respect to the other one (ADL/ECM versus difference ADL).
Below, we compare the estimations of the ADL(2,2), ADL-I and ECM(2,2) model
with the difference ADL model put forward for France in the comparative exercise in
Chatelain et al. [2001]. Our aim is to check what the estimation of thesemodels changes
with respect to other estimations done in the monetary transmission network (ECM and
difference ADL).
In the econometric models, we estimate the year effects by including time dummies.
The estimation of these econometric models presents three potential groups of problems.
First, there may be a correlation between explanatory variables and the fixed effect on
productivity level  i α  (ADL/ECM model) and/or the fixed effect on productivity growth
i f  in the difference ADL model. This feature is corrected by taking first differences in the
ADL/ECM model or by taking second differences in the difference ADL model. Second,
explanatory variables can be endogenous, so that an instrumental variables method is
recommended. Third, there is heteroscedasticity of disturbances. A method which takes
into account these problems is the generalised method of moments on first differences
(GMM) (Arellano and Bond [1991]).ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 20
The GMM estimation proceeds in two steps. A first step is an instrumental variable
estimation which provides estimated residuals. The second step takes into account
heteroscedasticity. Both first and second step estimates are consistent. The second step
estimates are efficient while the first ones are not (see Matyas [1999] for a detailed
presentation of GMM estimations). We estimate all models with first differences GMM
and instruments in levels with the Arellano and Bond [1991] method, using the DPD98
programs on Gauss.
4.  Data and Econometric Results
4.1. Data Description
The data set consists of firms’ annual accounts and additional information from surveys
collected by the Banque de France in the Balance Sheet Data Centre’s database. For our
econometric study, we selected an unbalanced sample of N=6,946 firms in the
manufacturing sector, over the period 1985-1999 (see appendix for details). The
estimation period is ten years (1990-1999). This sample was obtained after deleting
outliers for several variables and after selecting firms that were present for at least six
years consecutively (see the data appendix for the sample selection). A comparison with
some samples used in previous studies shows that our panel is rather large and includes a
larger set of small firms (tables 2 and 3).
Descriptive statistics for components of the user cost are presented on table 1 and for
variables used in the regressions on table 2. The evolution of these variables over time is
presented in figures 5 and 6. These statistics are presented after the removal of outliers and
firms that had not been present for at least six years consecutively (see data appendix).
4.2. Estimation Results with Entire Sample
In table 3, we compare estimations on our French sample using  the ECM model, used
by Ga￿otti and Generale [2001] and Mojon, Smets and Vermeulen [2001], and using the
difference ADL model used in Chatelain et al. [2001], Valderrema [2001], Chirinko and
Von Kalckreuth [2001] and Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen [2001]. It is important to define
now how we compute the auto-regressive component for the four models we investigate.
It is the sum of the auto-regressive parameters which appears in the ADL(2,2) and the
difference ADL(2,2):  2 1 γ γ + . This auto-regressive component enters at the denominator
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sensitivity not only for the ADL(2,2) and the difference ADL(2,2) models but also for the
ADL-I and ECM(2,2) models. The higher this auto-regressive component, the higher the
long run elasticities and sensitivities. We need to precise this point, as in the ADL-I and
the ECM(2,2), the ￿apparent￿ auto-regressive parameter is  1 1 − γ , although the underlying
auto-regressive component for computing long run elasticities and sensitivities is  2 1 γ γ + .
Using a Within estimator for the ECM(2,2), we find a similar result to that obtained by
Mojon, Smets, Vermeulen [2001] who use the BACH database and omit cash-flow in their
regression. The long-term user cost elasticity is very high (-0.67) and significant. Short-
run elasticity is ￿0.24. It is interesting to see that we find these similar results with a very
high number of disaggregated observations. Part of our sample is used for constructed
French data aggregated by size and sector in the BACH database. Note that the years of
estimation differ between our study and the one by Mojon, Smets and Vermeulen [2001].
In the Within estimation for the difference ADL(2,2) model, the sum of short-run user
cost elasticities is higher (￿0.38) than in the ECM(2,2) model (-0.24), but the long-run
user cost elasticity is now (-0.31), i.e. about half of the one with ECM(2,2) (-0.67). One
observes a similar decrease for long-run sales growth elasticity when shifting from the
ECM model (0.493) to the difference ADL model (0.146). These differences for long-run
elasticities are explained by the auto-regressive component of each model. In Within
estimations, the auto-regressive coefficient for the log of capital is 0.671 for the ECM.
The explained variable in the difference ADL model is first differences of
investment/capital ratios, which are much less auto-regressive in absolute value, and even
negative (-0.209However, the gap between investment cash-flow long-term sensitivities is
smaller when shifting from the ECM model to the difference ADL model (from 0.201 to
0.146). This is because the sum of short-run investment cash-flow sensitivities is three
times higher in the difference ADL model (0.176) than in the ECM model (0.066).
Using first difference GMM estimations, these auto-regressive parameters increase in
the ECM with respect to the Within estimations, which were biased downwards (from
0.671 to 0.796). Due to a very low standard error, this parameter is significantly different
from one. This result shows why  unit root problems can be set aside. The increase of the
auto-regressive parameter from Within to GMM estimator is also found in the difference
ADL model (from ￿0.209 to 0.10, no longer negative). However the gap between the auto-
regressive parameter of the ECM and the difference ADL remains very large in the GMM
estimation (0.796 to 0.1). Therefore, one gets the long-run coefficients by multiplying by
5 the sum of short-run coefficients in the ECM and by multiplying by 1.10 the sum of
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Conversely, short-run coefficients of sales, user cost and cash-flow are smaller in ECM
estimations than in the difference ADL. This result goes hand in hand with the fact that
the auto-regressive parameters explain much more of the variance in the ECM model. For
this reason, long-run elasticities are generally higher in the ECM model than in the
difference ADL, if ever the short-run elasticities are significant. However, in both models,
the user cost elasticity is not significantly different from zero when cash-flow and its lags
are explanatory variables. Sales growth elasticity is significant and lower than in the
Within case (where they were biased upwards). Long-term investment cash-flow
sensitivities are slightly increased using a GMM estimation (they were biased downwards
using Within estimates). The large differences between GMM and Within estimates stress
endogeneity and/or heteroscedasticity problems in the Within estimations. As the GMM
estimator has been designed to deal properly with these econometric problems, we make
no further reference to Within estimations in the following section.
As the difference ADL model was dealt with in detail in the Chatelain et al. [2001]
paper, we focus in the next section on the ADL(2,2) and ADL-I  model. Our next step is to
compare the above GMM results with the ones obtained estimating the ADL(2,2) model
and  ADL-I model(see table 4). In these two models, it was easy to check immediately
whether lags of order 2 were necessary or not. It turned out that lags of order 2 for sales,
user cost and cash-flow were not significant, whatever the set of instruments we tried. We
decided to remove these lags from our baseline equation. Nonetheless, lag 2 of the stock
of capital remained very often significant and was kept in the regressions.
In both models, the sum of the coefficient of the auto-regressive term was around 0.7
to 0.8 (this result corresponds to a coefficient of ln(K(t-2)) of ￿0.2 in model ADL-I). This
auto-regressive component is identical to the one  estimated in the ECM. When excluding
cash flow from regressions in the ADL model and in model ADL-I (table 4, regressions 1
to 4), we found fairly similar results in both models, even when removing the instrument
I(t-2)/K(t-3) (table 4, regression 1 and 2). The user cost is not significant in model ADL-I
when this instrument is added (the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is then
rejected), whereas it remains significant for the ADL model with an estimate of -0.23.
Sales are significant with a long-run elasticity between 0.3 and 0.5.
Introducing cash-flow to the regression leads to dramatic changes in the results. User
cost and sales growth are no longer significant. The investment cash-flow long-run
sensitivity is significant with a value of around 0.15.
5 These results are very close between
                                                     
5 Removing some instruments changes the results, with a sharp increase in the Sargan statistic, so that the 5%
threshold is rejected for its p-value. For the ADL model, we used lags of I(t)/K(t-1) instead of lags of Ln(K(t))ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  23
the two models (ADL and model ADL-I) so that the change of dependent variable and the
approximation of the first difference of Ln(K(t)) by the investment ratio does not affect the
results much. They are also close to the GMM results from the ECM and the difference
ADL model, although these models include additional lags of order 2.
The result that the introduction of cash-flow drives down to zero the elasticity of
the user cost with respect to investment (which was significant and negative before the
introduction of cash-flow) is robust to changes of the model: it holds for the ADL/ECM
and the difference ADL model. Not surprisingly, it is robust to the number of lags used in
each models. It holds for other computations of the user cost such as the apparent interest
rate alone, a user cost definition without taxation, a user cost including more individual
information related to investment tax credit, accounting depreciation instead of a constant
depreciation rate, or the ￿phi￿ parameter used by CrØpon and Gianella [2001] in order to
take into account in an ad hoc manner the tax differentials between dividends and capital
gains. It is robust to soft trimming of the growth rate of the user cost (removing 1% tails
of its distribution) or to hard trimming of the growth rate of the user cost (removing 5%
tails of its distribution). It is robust to the removal of interest charges from cash-flow in
order to avoid a potential collinearity problem between the apparent interest rate included
in the user cost and cash-flow. It is also robust to the substitution of cash-flow/capital by
the log of liquidity (cash stock).
However, this result is not robust to data and period selection: Chatelain [2001]
obtained a significant elasticity of the user cost excluding taxation on a sample more or
less included in the one we used in this study (a balanced panel of 4,025 firms from 1988
to 1996, estimated over the period 1993-1996). But this last result was only obtained after
strict upward testing procedures leading to the selection of highly exogenous instruments
(starting from a small set of very exogenous instruments and testing additional instruments
one by one, see Andrews (1999)). On this larger sample, a non-significant user cost was
robust to systematic changes of the instrument sets including lagged explanatory variables
using either upward testing procedures or downward testing procedures (starting from a
large number of instrument sets and removing some of them).
How can we explain that the effect of the introduction of cash-flow drives down the
user cost elasticity to zero, whereas it is significantly different from zero when cash-flow
are omitted?
                                                                                                                                                 
as instruments, because the stock of capital includes measurement errors. In so doing, we retained similar
instruments for the ADL and model ADL-I.ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 24
First, the user cost definition we retained is a linear function of a microeconomic
apparent interest rate which includes an agency premium. According to the broad credit
channel theory (Gertler and Hubbard [1988]), this agency premium decreases with respect
to collateral, which depends on expected profits, which in turn are very much dependant
on expected sales, among other factors (e.g. Oliner and Rudebush [1996] state that the
agency premium increases with the risk-free interest rate). Due to the correlation between
future profits and past profits, a potential explanation of the decrease of the elasticity of
the user cost, when cash-flow is added to the regression may lie in the joint correlation
between cash-flow, sales and the apparent interest rate (hence user cost), i.e. we face a
collinearity problem, which is not solved by GMM.
A second explanation is related to an aggregation bias and to the prevalence of self-
financing during the 1990s for some firms observed in the descriptive statistics both at the
macroeconomic and the microeconomic level: some firms may depend much more on
cash-flow than others. In that case, the omission of a dummy variable selecting these firms
may bias the estimations results. This is what we investigate in the following section.
4.3. Sample Split Results
We tried several sample splits to isolate firms more sensitive to cash-flow. Descriptive
statistics with respect to sectors and other sample splits are presented on table 5. Sample
splits with respect to size, to the share of intangibles and to the dividend pay-out ratio did
not bring relevant statistical and economic results.
First, we checked the sensitivity of estimated coefficients of the ADL(2,2) ?
model with respect to sectors (we considered five manufacturing sectors: the food
industry, intermediate goods, equipment goods, consumption goods and the car industry).
We did not find significant differences between sectors. But the differential coefficients
which were the closest to being significant were related to the equipment goods sector.
We then introduced a dummy variable related to the equipment goods sector vis-￿-vis the
other sectors. When cash-flow is not an explanatory variable, the differential coefficients
for sales and user cost are not significantly different from zero (table 6). When cash-flow
is an explanatory variable, its short-run (respectively long-run) differential coefficient is
significantly different from zero (+0.082, respectively +0.363). Thus, the equipment goods
sector is much more sensitive to cash-flow than others. It is remarkable that the user cost
is now significant for all firms with a long-run elasticity of -0.26 and sales growth with a
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Then, we considered a dummy variable for firms with a lower share of trade credit in
total liabilities (more precisely, firms for which this statistic is below the upper quartile).
This situation may be a signal that these firms are experiencing difficulties in securing
external finance . In the model without cash-flow, there are no significant differences for
those firms. When cash-flow is added, firms with low trade credit are no longer
significantly dependant on cash-flow, which is consistent with the above interpretation.
Note that this time, for all firms, sales growth is significant with a higher elasticity of
0.427, but user cost is not significant.
It is indeed possible that one criterion alone may not be sufficient. The "score"
allocated by the Banque de France is a combination of several criteria which makes it
possible to measure the risk of failure of firms. When cash-flow is omitted in the
regression, firms which are risky according to the Banque de France score (i.e. when the
score statistic is below ￿0.3) have a significantly lower elasticity with respect to sales than
others. But this result is no longer valid when cash-flow is added to the regression. Note
however that the Sargan test is only accepted at the 3% threshold. The differential
coefficient on cash-flow is significant in the short run (+0.216 in the long run). This result
was expected, as these firms experience more difficulties when trying to get external
finance. As for the equipment goods sector, the user cost elasticity is significant for all
firms (-0.207) as is sales growth elasticity (0.646).
These three dummy variables were able to isolate firms sensitive to cash-flow. We
found that omitting these dummy variables led to bias downwards to zero the estimate of
the elasticity of the user cost once cash-flow was included in the regression. When dummy
variables related to firms which are more sensitive to cash-flow are added to the model,
the user cost elasticity with respect to investment is at most 0.26 in absolute terms for all
the firms of our sample, using Generalised Method of Moments estimates in the ADL
model. This confirms the direct effect of the interest rate channel on investment, operating
through the cost of capital in France (there is also an indirect effect of monetary policy
shocks on the macroeconomic growth of sales, which also affects corporate investment).
We isolated three group of firms, for which investment is more sensitive to cash-flow
(i.e. their investment cash flow differential sensitivity ranges from 0.20 to 0.36): firms
facing a high risk of bankruptcy, firms belonging to the equipment goods sector (which
are more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations) and firms making extensive use of trade
credit, a potential substitute for short-term bank credit. The rather high investment cash-
flow sensitivity of these firms (0.22 up to 0.42), which represents about 20% of ourECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 26
sample, confirms the existence of a broad credit channel operating through corporate
investment in France.
5.  Conclusion
We investigated the properties of the ADL(2,2), ADL-I and ECM(2,2) model with
respect to the difference ADL model. These four models have been used in companions
papers of the MTN network: the MTN synthesis paper on firms by Chatelain et al. [2001]
and Von Kalckreuth [2001] focused on a difference ADL(3,3), Valderrama [2001]
focused on a difference ADL(1,1), Butzen, Fuss and Vermeulen on a difference
ADL(4,4), while Mojon, Smets and Vermeulen [2001] and Generale and Gaiotti [2001]
focused on an Error Correction Model of order 2. We considered an ADL specification of
the neo-classical demand for capital with a firm-specific user cost of capital to test for
investment behaviour in France, as the difference ADL estimation had already been
investigated for France in the MTN synthesis paper on firms by Chatelain et al. [2001].
Whatever the capital demand model and its number of lags, we found the following set of
results on our data set of French manufacturing firms, for the estimation period 1990-
1999:
- Without dummy variables related to sample splits, the user cost of capital has a
negative and significant elasticity with respect to capital using the traditional Within
estimates, or as long as cash-flow is not added to the regression when using Generalised
Method of Moments estimates. Using GMM, the elasticity has a lower absolute value than
in the Within case.
- When cash-flow is added to the regression without dummy variables related to
sample splits, the sales elasticity of capital has a lower value and the user cost elasticity is
no longer significant when using Generalised Method of Moments.
- When we introduce dummy variables related to sample splits (in particular risky
firms or equipment goods), we isolate a strong cash-flow effect for some groups of firms,
with the result that sales growth and user cost become significant for all firms. With a
dummy variable related to the trade credit criterion, the user cost is not significant but
sales growth is. These results show that there are distributional effects of monetary policy
on investment, driven by an asymmetric cash-flow channel. Risky firms, high trade credit
firms and equipment goods firms are more sensitive to cash-flow than other firms.
These results provide a first set of microeconomic results for the investment of French
manufacturing firms. They offer a basis  for further investigations into the effects of
monetary policy on individual investment, and the macro-economic consequences for the
monetary transmission channels as developed in Chatelain et al. [2001] and Angeloni et
al. [2001].ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  27
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APPENDIX
A.1 Sample Selection
The data source consists of compulsory accounting tax forms (collected by the Banque
de France in its FIBEN database ) and of additional information (in particular on leasing)
taken from surveys collected by the Banque de France (the Balance Sheet Data Centre’s
database ). These data are collected only from firms who are willing to provide them, a
procedure which creates a bias (small firms of fewer than 20 employees are under-
represented). No statistical sampling procedure has been used to correct this bias.
A first elimination of outliers was done on a larger unbalanced sample of
manufacturing firms without holdings. Outliers were excluded using ratios built on
information common to the two databases. The first step consisted in deleting firms with
missing or inconsistent data: we selected firms with no more than one fiscal account on
the same year and for which the length of the accounting period was 12 months. We
deleted firms for which the number of employees, sales, value added, assets, investment or
debt were negative. The second step consisted in removing the following data:
- first percentile and the two upper percentiles of investment over capital;
- first percentile and the two upper percentiles of cash-flow over capital;
- first and 99th percentile of the apparent interest rate;
- first and 99th percentile of debt over capital;
- first and 99th percentile of sales growth;
- first percentile and the two upper percentiles of user cost;
- below the 5% percentile and above the 95% percentiles of the growth rate of the user
cost.
From the initial Balance Sheet Data Centre database (209,112 initial observations), we
obtained an unbalanced panel of 61,237 observations i.e. 6,947 manufacturing firms
observed over 14 years.
A.2 Construction of the Variables
•   The Individual Variables
The first source is the compulsory accounting forms required under the French General
Tax Code. These forms are completed by the firms and numbered by the tax
administration (D.G.I.) from 2050 to 2058. We provide the code of each form omitting theECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  31
first two numbers For example, we denote item FN of tax form 2050 as ￿[50].FN￿. The
second source is the Banque de France survey of the Balance Sheet Data Centre. The form
2065 provides information on mergers and acquisitions. The form 2066 provides
information on leasing. For example, we denote ￿[cdb65].031￿ the item 031 of the survey
form 2065. Data common to monetary transmission network papers are constructed
according to Chatelain and Kashyap￿s note (2000).
Sales are total net sales [52].FL, plus the change in inventories of own production of
goods and services [52].FM, plus own production of goods and services capitalised
[52].FN divided by the value added deflator.
Cash flow is output ([52].FL+FM+FL+FO+FQ) minus intermediate consumption
([52].FS+FU+FT+FV+FW+FX) minus personal costs ([52].FY+FZ) plus net financial
income ([52].GP-GU) minus corporate income tax ([53].HK) plus operating depreciation
and provisions ([52].GA+GB+GC+GD+[56](5T-UF)).
Productive gross investment is the sum of total increases by acquisition of tangible
assets [54].LP minus the sum of (i) the decreases by transfers of tangible assets under
construction [54].MY, and (ii) the decreases by transfers of deposits and prepayments
[54].NC minus [cdb65].031.




































































Gross debt  it B  includes quasi equity [51].DO (proceeds from issues of participating
securities plus subordinated loans), convertible bonds [51].DS, other bonds [51].DT, bank
borrowings [51].DU, other borrowings [51].DV, other liabilities [51].EA and discount
[58].YS minus the bond redemption premium [50].CM.
Apparent interest rate  it AI  is the ratio of interest and similar charges [52].GR to gross
debt.
Equity  it E  is stockholders’ equity [51].DL.
The long-term interest rate  t LD is the French ten-year government reference bond rate.ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 32
The statutory tax rate  t τ  is [53].HK except for firms which were not paying corporate
income tax on a given year.The rate is set at zero for these firms in this given year.
 6
The capital stock is the value in replacement terms of the capital stock book value of
property, plant and equipment. To convert the book value of the gross capital stock into its
replacement value, we used the following iterative perpetual inventory formula:








where the investment goods deflator is denoted 
I
st p  and the depreciation rate is taken















0  with  ,   − = =
The book value of the gross capital stock of property, plant and equipment 
BV
it K 0  on the
first available year for each firm is obtained by the sum of land [50].AN, buildings
[50].AP, industrial and technical plant [50].AR, other plant and equipment [50].AT, plant,
property and equipment under construction [50].AV and payments in advance/on account
for plant, property and equipment [50].AX. It is deflated by assuming that the sectoral
price of capital is equal to the sectoral price of investment  mean T  years before the date
when the first book value was available, where  mean T  represents the corrected average age
of capital (this method of evaluation of capital is sometimes called the ￿stock method￿).
The average age of capital  mean T  is computed by using the sectoral useful life of capital
goods  max T  and the share of goods which has been already depreciated in the first




it K p  (
BV
it0 DEPR is the total book
value of depreciation allowances in year  0 t  according to the following formula
7:
                                                     
6 As the investment tax credit rate ([51].DJ divided by investment) is 0% for more than 80% of companies and
over 95% for 5% of companies, in the end we did not take it into account.
7 This formula is used by Jacques Mairesse in the Bond et al. [1997] paper.ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001  33
. 8
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The book value of depreciation allowances 
BV
it0 DEPR  is obtained by the sum of
depreciation, amortisation and provisions on land [50].AO, on buildings [50].AQ, on
industrial and technical plant [50].AS, on other plant and equipment [50].AU, on plant,
property and equipment under construction [50].AW and on payment in advance/on
account for plant, property and equipment [50].AY.
The sectoral useful life of capital goods is  15 max = T  years, except for sectors C4
( 13 max = T ), sector D0 ( 16 max = T ), sectors E1 and E2 ( 14 max = T ), sector E3
( 12 max = T ), and finally sector F1 ( 17 max = T ).
•   The Sectoral Variables
We selected 5 NES16 sectors: food products, consumption goods industries, equipment
goods industries, intermediate products industries, and the car industry.
Investment goods deflators 
I
st p  used for the NES16 sectors are taken from the Annual
National Accounts (base 1995).
Gross value-added deflators  st p  used for the  NES16 sectors are taken from the Annual
National (base 1995).ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 34
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6 Table 1: Average Values of the Cost of Equity, the Cost of Debt and the User Cost of capital
Year pi/pva Leverage Apparent
Interest Rate
Cost of Equity Growth of pi Depreciation User Cost
1986 0.99 0.55 0.12 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.18
1987 0.99 0.51 0.11 0.18 0.03 0.08 0.18
1988 0.98 0.48 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.15
1989 1.00 0.48 0.11 0.14 0.02 0.08 0.17
1990 0.99 0.47 0.12 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.17
1991 1.00 0.46 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.18
1992 1.00 0.46 0.11 0.12 -0.002 0.08 0.20
1993 0.99 0.44 0.12 0.09 0.006 0.08 0.17
1994 1.01 0.42 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.17
1995 1.00 0.42 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.16
1996 1.03 0.41 0.09 0.09 0.001 0.08 0.18
1997 1.03 0.40 0.09 0.09 -0.004 0.08 0.18
1998 1.03 0.39 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.16
1999 1.05 0.38 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.16
Mean 1.01 0.43 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.17
Pi/pva is the relative price of investment (base year 1995, 5 manufacturing sectors, NES16, retropolated
before 1993), Growth of pi is the inflation rate of investment goods. Leverage is debt/(debt+equity), and
not debt/total liabilities. The apparent interest rate is (debt service/debt). Cost of equity : long run rate













































Table 2: Summary Statistics on the complete cleaned data set (Number of firms: 6,946.
Number of Observations: 61,237)
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 25% Median 75% Maximum
It/Kt-1 0.122 0.141 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.15 1.43
∆log St 0.0296 0.153 -1.78 -0.05 0.03 0.11 1.36
∆log UCt -0.009 0.14 -0.34 -0.11 -0.015 0.09 0.36
 CFt/Kt-1 0.33 0.33 -0.45 0.16 0.26 0.41 4.32
Log St 8.83 1.38 4.51 7.84 8.61 9.60 17.2
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0 Table 3: Econometric Results: I(t)/K(t-1) as dependent variable
Error Correction Model (2,2) Difference-ADL(2,2)
Within Estimations GMM Two-Steps Within Estimations GMM Two-Steps
Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats
I(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.248 -25.71 -0.111 -3.64 -0.102 -11.41 0.088 8.94
I(t-2)/K(t-3) -0.107 -16.31 0.012 1.81
∆ Log S(t) 0.118 20.85 0.027 0.75 0.084 15.79 0.004 0.11
∆ Log S(t-1) 0.134 20.22 0.043 1.17 0.065 11.76 0.039 5.36
∆ Log S(t-2) 0.028 5.30 0.008 1.47
(LogK-LogS) (t-2) -0.329 -40.32 -0.204 -5.93
Log S(t-2) -0.167 -22.69 -0.165 -5.26
Log UC(t) -0.237 -29.48 -0.018 -0.63
Log UC(t-1) 0.017 2.46 0.003 0.19
Log UC(t-2) 0.000 -0.06 0.015 1.52
∆ Log UC(t) -0.197 -28.25 -0.008 -0.34
∆ Log UC(t-1) -0.116 -16.84 -0.011 -0.91
∆ Log UC(t-2) -0.065 -11.01 0.004 0.58
CF(t)/K(t-1) 0.024 4.12 0.019 0.70 0.063 9.71 0.102 3.72
CF(t-1)/K(t-2) 0.036 6.98 0.030 2.09 0.069 11.64 0.075 5.56
CF(t-2)/K(t-3) 0.006 1.33 -0.001 -0.10 0.044 7.82 0.0z16 2.47
Auto-regressive coeff. 0.671* 0.796* -0.209* 0.100*
Long term eff. Sales 0.493* 0.188* 0.146* 0.057*
Long term eff. User
Cost
-0.669* 0.001 -0.313* -0.016
Long term eff. C.-Flow 0.201 0.239* 0.146* 0.215*
AR2 -1.746 p=0.081 -1.737 p=0.082
Sargan 164.03 p=0.133 156.27 p=0.247














































Table 4: Econometric Results: Comparison of ADL and model ADL-I with or without Cash-Flow and using different types of instruments.
1: ADL(2,2) 2: Model ADL-I 3: ADL(2,2) 4: Model ADL-I 5: ADL(2,2) 6: Model ADL-I
Dependent variable log(K(t)) I(t)/K(t-1) log(K(t)) I(t)/K(t-1) log(K(t)) I(t)/K(t-1)
Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats
K(t-1) 0.700 12.82 0.810 37.31 0.852 32.44
I(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.266 -4.99 -0.211 -4.12 -0.126 -5.17
Log K(t-2) 0.024 0.58 -0.306 -13.62 -0.059 -6.30 -0.270 -13.23 -0.057 -5.99 -0.223 -8.62
Log S(t) 0.064 2.19 0.072 1.94 0.060 2.02 0.007 0.21 0.036 1.21 0.033 0.85
Log S(t-1) 0.070 2.47 0.096 2.76 0.062 2.22 0.072 2.21 0.026 0.98 0.039 1.20
Log UC(t) -0.057 -2.70 -0.050 -1.79 -0.054 -2.54 -0.031 -1.14 -0.028 -1.34 -0.008 -0.31
Log UC(t-1) -0.029 -2.03 -0.030 -1.79 -0.004 -0.39 -0.019 -1.15 -0.006 -0.61 -0.008 -0.72
C F ( t ) / K ( t - 1 ) -------- 0.012 0.55 0.007 0.25
C F ( t - 1 ) / K ( t - 2 ) -------- 0.018 2.17 0.030 2.96
Auto-regressive coeff. 0.724* 0.794* 0.751* 0.730* 0.795* 0.777*
Long term eff. Sales 0.485* 0.549* 0.491* 0.293* 0.308 0.325
Long term eff. User
Cost
-0.311* -0.262* -0.232* -0.183 -0.163 -0.074
Long term eff. C.Flow ---- 0.150* 0.167*
AR2 -2.507 p=0.012 -2,316 p = 0.021 -2.03 p=0.043 -1,871 p = 0.061 -2,033 p=0.042 -1.87 p = 0.062
Sargan 123.97 p=0.06 123.07 p = 0.067 129.45 p=0.11 139.98 p = 0.033 175.11 p=0.063 171.44 p = 0.091
Instruments: lags of
I(t)/K(t-1) 3 to 5 3 to 5 2 to 5 2 to 5 2 to 5 2 to 5
Log S(t) 2 to 5 2 to 5 2 to 5 2 to 5 2 to 5 2 to 5
Log UC(t) 2 to 5 2 to 5 2 to 5 2 to 5 2 to 5 2 to 5
C F ( t ) / K ( t - 1 ) ----2  t o  5 2  t o  5












































Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Various groups of firms
Number Main Variables
of Firms I(t)/K(t-1) ∆LogS(t) ∆LogUC(t) CF(t)/K(t-1) LogS(t) LogUC(t)
Sectors
Food products 929 0.12 0.01 -0.014 0.27 9.3 -1.8
Intermediate products 3371 0.11 0.04 -0.005 0.29 8.8 -1.7
Equipment goods 1227 0.12 0.04 -0.008 0.37 8.7 -1.8
Consumption goods 1286 0.15 0.01 -0.02 0.47 8.7 -1.8
Car industry 133 0.12 0.03 -0.02 0.31 9.8 -1.8
Employees
<100 5195 0.12 0.03 -0.008 0.33 8.8 -1.8
>100 1751 0.13 0.03 -0.009 0.32 8.2 -1.8
<250 6192 0.12 0.03 -0.009 0.33 8.5 -1.8
>250 754 0.12 0.03 -0.009 0.36 11.3 -1.8
Intangible Assets
< Q3 0.13 0.03 -0.011 0.42 8.7 -1.8
> Q3 0.12 0.03 -0.007 0.30 8.9 -1.8
Scoring Function
No score 481 0.12 0.003 0.004 0.30 9.0 -1.8
Risky Firms 1293 0.12 0.03 -0.008 0.30 8.6 -1.8
Neutral Firms 1169 0.11 0.01 -0.007 0.28 8.5 -1.7
Riskness Firms 4003 0.13 0.04 -0.01 0.36 8.9 -1.8
Trade Credit
< Q3 0.13 0.06 -0.003 0.33 8.8 -1.8
> Q3 0.12 0.02 -0.011 0.33 8.8 -1.8
Dividends
< Q3 0.12 0.02 -0.02 0.40 9.2 -1.8













































Table 6: Auto-regressive distributed lags model with log(K) as endogenous variable.
Sensitivity to risk Sensitivity to Trade Credit Sensitivity to Equipement Goods
Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats Coeff. T-Stats
Log K(t-1) 0.801 33.06 0.827 30.713 0.811 31.56 0.822 31.370 0.819 36.46 0.835 34.427
Log K(t-2) -0.070 -5.07 -0.066 -5.339 -0.059 -6.36 -0.050 -5.670 -0.055 -6.06 -0.052 -6.206
Log S(t) 0.087 3.12 0.091 3.210 0.081 2.88 0.075 2.788 0.050 2.06 0.041 1.743
Log S(t-1) 0.105 4.29 0.064 2.697 0.051 1.68 0.023 0.826 0.026 1.04 0.022 0.944
Log UC(t) -0.057 -2.96 -0.034 -1.824 -0.035 -1.22 -0.035 -1.306 -0.047 -2.66 -0.049 -3.019
Log UC(t-1) -0.012 -1.26 -0.016 -1.707 0.002 0.13 0.003 0.226 -0.006 -0.59 -0.007 -0.777
CF(t)/K(t-1) -0.015 -0.636 0.058 2.406 -0.004 -0.185
CF(t-1)/K(t-2) 0.019 2.147 -0.001 -0.033 0.018 2.025
Differential coef. for: Risky Firms Risky Firms Low Trade Credit Low Trade Credit Equipment Goods Equipment Goods
Log K(t-1) -0.045 -0.54 -0.050 -0.689 -0.010 -0.506 0.003 0.195 -0.021 -0.69 0.026 0.901
Log K(t-2) 0.074 1.06 0.086 1.542 0.000 0.665 0.000 0.598 0.000 -0.12 0.001 0.717
Log S(t) 0.050 1.51 0.014 0.401 -0.002 -0.457 0.004 0.919 0.011 0.83 0.004 0.411
Log S(t-1) -0.083 -2.55 -0.046 -1.489 0.009 0.505 -0.004 -0.236 0.025 0.97 -0.008 -0.322
Log UC(t) 0.030 1.39 0.023 1.067 -0.030 -1.223 -0.011 -0.481 0.021 0.89 0.004 0.172
Log UC(t-1) 0.007 0.38 0.007 0.425 0.000 0.014 -0.002 -0.195 -0.004 -0.25 -0.001 -0.067
CF(t)/K(t-1) 0.077 2.328 -0.083 -3.413 0.082 3.260
CF(t-1)/K(t-2) -0.034 -2.114 0.026 1.392 -0.014 -0.903
Long term eff. Sales 0.711* 0.646* 0.534* 0.427* 0.324* 0.291*
L.T. eff. User Cost -0.258* -0.207* -0.133 -0.140 -0.222* -0.259*
L.T. eff. Cash-Flow 0.018* 0.251* 0.066*
Differential coef. for: Risky Firms Risky Firms Low Trade Credit Low Trade Credit Equipment Goods Equipment Goods
Long term eff. Sales -0.051* -0.041 0.006 0.009 0.110 0.022
L.T. eff. User Cost 0.124 0.110 -0.110 -0.061 0.085 -0.021
L.T. eff. Cash-Flow 0.216* -0.250* 0.363*
AR2 -1.871 p = 0.061 -1.993 p = 0.046 -2.077 p = 0.038 -2.266 p = 0.023 -2.194 p = 0.028 -2.077 p = 0.038
Sargan 216.59 p = 0.045 300.91 p = 0.031 188.67 p = 0.371 288.22 p = 0.088 221.01 p = 0.029 275.48 p=0.204
Instruments used in the regressions are all explanatory variables lagged 2 to 5.ECB • Working Paper No 106 • December 2001 44
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